Comments on: The Logic of Collective Action http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/the-logic-of-collective-action/ Fri, 10 Feb 2012 10:56:26 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3 By: My bookmarks | About Social Data http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/the-logic-of-collective-action/comment-page-1/#comment-31045 My bookmarks | About Social Data Wed, 14 Sep 2011 12:30:16 +0000 http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/?p=547#comment-31045 [...] The Logic of Collective Action | Michael Nielsen [...] [...] The Logic of Collective Action | Michael Nielsen [...]

]]> By: Rethinking activism « John A. Duerk http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/the-logic-of-collective-action/comment-page-1/#comment-30017 Rethinking activism « John A. Duerk Mon, 10 Jan 2011 05:24:49 +0000 http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/?p=547#comment-30017 [...] views on this matter after reading The Logic of Collective Action by Mancur Olson (here’s a blog post that summarizes his arguments).  Given the kind of grassroots activism that I usually engage in, I [...] [...] views on this matter after reading The Logic of Collective Action by Mancur Olson (here’s a blog post that summarizes his arguments).  Given the kind of grassroots activism that I usually engage in, I [...]

]]> By: Notional Slurry » links for 2009-11-06 http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/the-logic-of-collective-action/comment-page-1/#comment-26339 Notional Slurry » links for 2009-11-06 Sat, 07 Nov 2009 06:09:04 +0000 http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/?p=547#comment-26339 [...] Michael Nielsen » The Logic of Collective Action "What Olson shows in the book is that although all parties in a group may strongly desire and benefit from a particular collective good (e.g., a stable climate), under many circumstances they will not take individual action to achieve that collective good. In particular, they often find it in their individual best interest to act against their collective interest. The book has a penetrating analysis of what conditions can cause individual and collective interests to be aligned, and what causes them to be out of alignement." (tags: via:jyew collaboration openness economics collective-action social-norms social-psychology classics) [...] [...] Michael Nielsen » The Logic of Collective Action "What Olson shows in the book is that although all parties in a group may strongly desire and benefit from a particular collective good (e.g., a stable climate), under many circumstances they will not take individual action to achieve that collective good. In particular, they often find it in their individual best interest to act against their collective interest. The book has a penetrating analysis of what conditions can cause individual and collective interests to be aligned, and what causes them to be out of alignement." (tags: via:jyew collaboration openness economics collective-action social-norms social-psychology classics) [...]

]]> By: Mailund on the Internet » Blog Archive » This week in the blogs… http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/the-logic-of-collective-action/comment-page-1/#comment-17540 Mailund on the Internet » Blog Archive » This week in the blogs… Sun, 01 Feb 2009 12:14:16 +0000 http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/?p=547#comment-17540 [...] The logic of collective action (Michael Nielsen) [...] [...] The logic of collective action (Michael Nielsen) [...]

]]> By: Mickey Schafer http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/the-logic-of-collective-action/comment-page-1/#comment-17487 Mickey Schafer Fri, 30 Jan 2009 16:32:18 +0000 http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/?p=547#comment-17487 One last look -- Yokai Benkler among others giving talks at the TED conferences -- this is the collection on collaboration, many of which may be of interest to readers of this post: http://www.ted.com/index.php/themes/the_rise_of_collaboration.html Great speakers, freely available, and just 18 min long! One last look — Yokai Benkler among others giving talks at the TED conferences — this is the collection on collaboration, many of which may be of interest to readers of this post: http://www.ted.com/index.php/themes/the_rise_of_collaboration.html

Great speakers, freely available, and just 18 min long!

]]> By: Bee http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/the-logic-of-collective-action/comment-page-1/#comment-17455 Bee Thu, 29 Jan 2009 23:39:18 +0000 http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/?p=547#comment-17455 Hi Michael, Indeed, you can't and that's too bad. If it was up to me I'd let people opt out of the social contract. I doubt many would do it. It is of course true that governments enforce laws, without it you wouldn't overcome most collective action problems. But the point I was trying to make is that people agreed to have a government and to obey laws, and to have law enforcement, because it allows them to organzie their lives and to balances one person's freedom with other people's rights (if it's a democracy). If some laws have to be enforced that's mostly to avoid inconsistencies (you might not want to pay taxes, but you want to benefit from what is paid with these taxes). Best, B. Hi Michael,

Indeed, you can’t and that’s too bad. If it was up to me I’d let people opt out of the social contract. I doubt many would do it. It is of course true that governments enforce laws, without it you wouldn’t overcome most collective action problems. But the point I was trying to make is that people agreed to have a government and to obey laws, and to have law enforcement, because it allows them to organzie their lives and to balances one person’s freedom with other people’s rights (if it’s a democracy). If some laws have to be enforced that’s mostly to avoid inconsistencies (you might not want to pay taxes, but you want to benefit from what is paid with these taxes). Best,

B.

]]> By: Michael Nielsen http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/the-logic-of-collective-action/comment-page-1/#comment-17450 Michael Nielsen Thu, 29 Jan 2009 21:43:31 +0000 http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/?p=547#comment-17450 Michael - The paper by Gans and Stern is on my desk beside me as I type - Joshua Gans kindly emailed it to me a few days back. It looks very interesting, and I plan to read it soon. I'll keep your comment in mind when reading Schelling. Michael – The paper by Gans and Stern is on my desk beside me as I type – Joshua Gans kindly emailed it to me a few days back. It looks very interesting, and I plan to read it soon.

I’ll keep your comment in mind when reading Schelling.

]]> By: Michael Nielsen http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/the-logic-of-collective-action/comment-page-1/#comment-17449 Michael Nielsen Thu, 29 Jan 2009 21:39:06 +0000 http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/?p=547#comment-17449 Mickey - That's a nice take on the Goldcorp story. In some sense, they provide a collective good (open participation in an online group) in the conscious knowledge that the benefits to everyone are so great that it's worth it. In the language of my post, it's as though a small restriction in production could cause a big jump in price, so it would be worth it for all the participants. Mickey – That’s a nice take on the Goldcorp story. In some sense, they provide a collective good (open participation in an online group) in the conscious knowledge that the benefits to everyone are so great that it’s worth it. In the language of my post, it’s as though a small restriction in production could cause a big jump in price, so it would be worth it for all the participants.

]]> By: Michael Nielsen http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/the-logic-of-collective-action/comment-page-1/#comment-17448 Michael Nielsen Thu, 29 Jan 2009 21:20:19 +0000 http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/?p=547#comment-17448 Hope - Thankyou, I'm very flattered you suggest it :-) Hope – Thankyou, I’m very flattered you suggest it :-)

]]> By: Michael Nielsen http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/the-logic-of-collective-action/comment-page-1/#comment-17447 Michael Nielsen Thu, 29 Jan 2009 21:18:46 +0000 http://michaelnielsen.org/blog/?p=547#comment-17447 Benjamin - That's a really nice way of looking at it! I guess Axelrod is talking about the limit of very small groups (2 people), where there is ongoing interaction. It's the opposite extreme to Olson, who is most interested in large groups, and cases where interaction is limited. A very rough reading of the two is that Axelrod more or less says that you should _expect_ co-operation in the limit he's considering, while Olson says you should _expect_ non-co-operation in the limit he's considering. Benjamin – That’s a really nice way of looking at it! I guess Axelrod is talking about the limit of very small groups (2 people), where there is ongoing interaction. It’s the opposite extreme to Olson, who is most interested in large groups, and cases where interaction is limited. A very rough reading of the two is that Axelrod more or less says that you should _expect_ co-operation in the limit he’s considering, while Olson says you should _expect_ non-co-operation in the limit he’s considering.

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