Quantum Arrow's Theorem

Polymath: Does Arrow's Theorem hold in quantum voting?

Arrow's theorem is a classical result in political game theory. One wishes to construct an aggregation rule (or social welfare function) which takes as input the individual preference rankings members of the society have, and output an aggregated preference ranking.

Arrow's theorem only holds in the case that there are more than 2 choices to compare.

One naturally imposes some restrictions on the aggregation rule, which we take as the classical axioms: Pareto efficiency and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (see below for a description. Arrow's theorem states that if an aggregation rule satisfies these axioms, then one member of society necessarily acts as a Dictator, i.e., there exists one person whose personal preference ranking determines the aggregated ranking.

This Polymath Project has two purposes:

Identify what a system of ``quantum preferences is, and
Determine whether Arrow's Theorem holds or not in that setting. i.e., is there a Dictator whose preferences determine the aggregated preferences?

Formal statement of the theorem

(taken from Wikipedia)

Let [math]\displaystyle{ \mathrm{A} }[/math] be a set of outcomes, [math]\displaystyle{ \mathrm{N} }[/math] a number of voters or decision criteria. We shall denote the set of all full linear orderings of [math]\displaystyle{ \mathrm{A} }[/math] by [math]\displaystyle{ \mathrm{L(A)} }[/math].

A (strict) social welfare function (preference aggregation rule) is a function [math]\displaystyle{ F : \mathrm{L(A)}^N \to \mathrm{L(A)} }[/math] which aggregates voters' preferences into a single preference order on [math]\displaystyle{ \mathrm{A} }[/math].<ref>Note that by definition, a social welfare function as defined here satisfies the Unrestricted domain condition. Restricting the range to the social preferences that are never indifferent between distinct outcomes is probably a very restrictive assumption, but the goal here is to give a simple statement of the theorem. Even if the restriction is relaxed, the impossibility result will persist.</ref> The [math]\displaystyle{ \mathrm{N} }[/math]-tuple [math]\displaystyle{ (R_1, \ldots, R_N) }[/math] of voters' preferences is called a preference profile. In its strongest and most simple form, Arrow's impossibility theorem states that whenever the set [math]\displaystyle{ \mathrm{A} }[/math] of possible alternatives has more than 2 elements, then the following three conditions become incompatible:

unanimity, or Pareto efficiency: If alternative a is ranked above b for all orderings [math]\displaystyle{ R_1 , \ldots, R_N }[/math], then a is ranked higher than b by [math]\displaystyle{ F(R_1, R_2, \ldots, R_N) }[/math]. (Note that unanimity implies non-imposition).

non-dictatorship: There is no individual i whose preferences always prevail. That is, there is no [math]\displaystyle{ i \in \{1, \ldots,N\} }[/math] such that Template:Nobreak

independence of irrelevant alternatives: For two preference profiles [math]\displaystyle{ (R_1, \ldots, R_N) }[/math] and [math]\displaystyle{ (S_1, \ldots, S_N) }[/math] such that for all individuals i, alternatives a and b have the same order in [math]\displaystyle{ R_i }[/math] as in [math]\displaystyle{ S_i }[/math], alternatives a and b have the same order in [math]\displaystyle{ F(R_1,R_2, \ldots, R_N) }[/math] as in [math]\displaystyle{ F(S_1,S_2, \ldots, S_N) }[/math].

What is a good model for quantum preference?

Here, we take [math]\displaystyle{ R_1, \ldots, R_N }[/math] to be basis vectors in [math]\displaystyle{ N }[/math]-dimensional Hilbert space [math]\displaystyle{ \mathbb C^N }[/math].

The whole point of quantum preference is that people's true preferences can exist in superposition: e.g., they may be .8 liberal and .6i conservative ([math]\displaystyle{ .8^2 + .6^2 = 1 }[/math]).

A model for the single-voter spinor (wavefunction)

Let [math]\displaystyle{ k\in\mathbb N }[/math]

What are the quantum analogues of Arrow's axioms?

What is a Dictator in the quantum setting?

It is not clear what it means for one person to be a Dictator in this setting.